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COMMENTARY
STATUS VERSUS BEHAVIOR
THOMAS SOWELL*
The central issue regarding the Equal Rights Amendment has been
posed as whether men and women should have equal status. A more
fundamental question is whether social decisions must be based on sta-
tus rather than behavior-and "must" is the proper word when speak-
ing of a constitutional amendment. This is part of a larger issue in
social decisionmaking in general-where it should be located, and on
what principle it should be based.
Perhaps the point is easiest to illustrate with an example remote
enough to be seen as a problem in institutional decisionmaking, rather
than as a categorical moral choice. Some years ago, Quebec authorities
imposed a requirement that airline pilots speak with control towers in
that province only in French. To the Quebec authorities it was an issue
of the equal status of their language with English. To virtually every-
one else-including international airline pilots, who organized a boy-
cott of Quebec airports-it was a question of behavior, not status.
What mattered behaviorally were the likely consequences of requiring
pilots familiar with English as an international language to risk hun-
dreds of lives on communication in a less familiar tongue. In short, the
pilots' concerns involved precisely those elements missing from the sta-
tus perspective: namely, probabilities and costs.
There are decisionmaking processes in which treating people the
same implies or requires no similarity in behavior, as when a govern-
ment counts all citizens' votes the same, or when a sports official ap-
plies the same rules to players of widely differing abilities. This cannot
be universalized, however, and universalizing is what is at issue with
constitutional amendments. Other decisions and institutions require
that individuals be sorted by performance-prospectively as well as ret-
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rospectively, so that probabilities and high knowledge costs become
considerations.
The behavior of women differs from that of men not only in gross
physical terms and in volitional behavior, but also in longevity, suscep-
tibility to disease, and rates of maturation. Courts have already substi-
tuted status equality for behavioral difference as the basis for
retirement premiums and benefits. With a decade's difference in life
expectancy, a woman's retirement years specifically are some multiple
of a man's. The cost of given retirement benefits per year, therefore,
varies enormously according to the sex composition of the recipients-
a fact not likely to be lost sight of by employers when choosing among
job applicants, or when deciding whether to have a company retire-
ment plan at all, or how large to make it.
The extension of more status-based decisions, imposed by the central
government on millions of other decisionmakers concerned with be-
havioral realities, is the crucial danger in many contemporary schemes
that feature the word "equal," including the Equal Rights Amendment.
Proponents of such schemes depict the issue as being equality versus
inequality, when in fact such centrally directed, status-based schemes
have common features and effects, whether the ascribed status is equal-
ity, inferiority, or superiority. Moreover, the problems entailed by such
schemes adversely affect not only efficiency, but-more importantly-
freedom.
By status-based decisionmaking, I mean decisions based on or con-
strained by an ascribed status or ranking, centrally imposed, as distin-
guished from decisions based on individual assessments of behavioral
performance or prospects by each decisionmaker independently. The
status involved may be, as I say, equality, inferiority, superiority, to any
degree. Examples would be Jim Crow laws, royal privileges, Nazi ra-
cial ideology, class enemies under Communism, or equality by any cri-
terion one wants to use. What this implies, first of all, is that there must
be some authoritative truth, regardless of empirical realities or differing
individual perceptions by people who have to make decisions. Among
the consequences of this kind of decisionmaking constraint is a diver-
gence between the official status and the actual behavior, and between
the actual behavior and the behavior as perceived by the immediate
decisionmakers. Even in societies imbued with a particular ideology,
such as the South during slavery, there are numerous opportunities for
individual economic or social gains by diluting or disregarding
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ascribed status. For example, urban slaves typically were allowed a
greater level of freedom, largely in the interest of the slave owners-
and despite laws and constant complaints from the rest of the white
population.
In the Soviet Union there is a prescribed status, or in this case, a
proscribed status for descendants of the former capitalist class. Never-
theless, it has been found that the offspring of those capitalist classes
have certain managerial talents useful to the Soviet state. So despite
various attempts in the law to give them a lower status, in point of fact,
they are heavily overrepresented among the current generation of So-
viet managers. In terms of efficiency, status-based decisions inhibit the
achievement of optimum performance, so this is a reason why these
exceptions are made even in systems that are considered monolithic.
It may be that our society is sufficiently prosperous that a little loss of
efficiency here and there may not mean quite as much as it might some-
where else. The individual losses perhaps might be bearable, looked at
that way. The most serious question is the question of freedom.
The inefficiencies are important in this context in that they provide a
continuing set of incentives for individual decisionmakers to behave in
ways at variance with the centrally ascribed status-again, regardless of
whether that status is equality or inequality or otherwise. Even where
the ascribed status attempts to correct some injustice, it clearly creates
other injustices to other people as a result of the inefficiencies involved.
That is, when someone loses an income or a standard of living, it is by
no means clear a priori that these losses will be greater or smaller than
the gains in correcting the injustice. The losses are no less real because
the individuals who suffer them may not belong to some group that is
readily categorizable by sex, race, or some other easily recognizable
feature. Given the divergence between the officially ascribed uniform
status, whatever it might be, and the actual performance of diverse
human beings, and the perceptions of diverse decisionmakers, the ini-
tial centralization of decisionmaking tends to be followed by further
curtailments of freedom to enforce the decision on recalcitrant deci-
sionmakers who do not want to be bound by something that is inappli-
cable in their circumstances.
There is a loss of freedom among even the privileged groups in a
highly status-based society such as the antebellum South. In South Af-
rica, clearly in Nazi Germany, and in the USSR, there have been such
things as increasing surveillance and a shift in the burden of proof
Number 11
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when the status-based rulings are at issue legally-as also, for example,
under affirmative action here, where things we once regarded as confi-
dential are not regarded as confidential any more. Such records must
be routinely forwarded to federal agents in order that they may rum-
mage through and find what they will. This shift of the burden of proof
has been fairly dramatic also, particularly when you compare it with
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act in which it was quite clear
that the sponsors of the Act wanted people convicted when they inten-
tionally engaged in discrimination. Now the administration of the law,
in point of fact, simply infers such intentions wherever the numbers do
not please the bureaucrats.
One of the other costs that should not be minimized, even if it cannot
be quantified, is the sense of demoralization that takes over as people
are engaged in some basically fraudulent process-as when they pre-
tend to be able to hire various numbers or percentages of various
groups, knowing in advance that they either will not or cannot.
Another of the consequences of this system is that social issues are
dealt with not in terms of policies that are adjustable incrementally ac-
cording to situations, but according to rights; that is, rigidities that ap-
ply categorically over very broad areas, regardless of the individual
circumstances. There must be rights in any society; that is, things that
are rigid and categorical. But because there must be some of these
things does not mean that they are incrementally beneficial in all areas.
Rights have a cost to the individual who has the rights as well as a cost
to society at large. There would be no waivers, for example, of the
right to see faculty recommendations when you apply to graduate
school, if in fact that right did not entail more cost to the individual
than the benefits. The problem arises when the individual no longer
has that choice, when he has certain rights that cannot be waived. One
of the costs is the number of voluntary transactions that tends to be
reduced as the number of rights is increased. This is not a peculiarity
in American society. In the Soviet Union, for example, young workers
have special rights that older workers don't have. One of the conse-
quences, of course, is that Soviet managers try not to hire younger
workers. A very common phenomenon is that relatives of people on a
job tend to acquire special rights de facto because they are relatives.
One of the consequences of that is a rule against nepotism.
Imagine three individuals with whom you might transact, either as a
landlord, employer, or marriage partner for that matter. One is an ille-
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gal alien, one is a diplomat with diplomatic immunity, and the other is
an ordinary citizen. Clearly, it would cost you the least to transact with
the illegal alien because he would have fewer rights that he could exer-
cise. The citizen would be next, and the person with whom you would
be most reluctant to transact is the one who has the most rights, the
diplomat.
One of the other things that comes along with the rights approach to
public policymaking in this area is a certain crudity in the manner in
which the rights are applied. We have seen this to some extent in af-
firmative action programs in which numbers supposedly prove inten-
tions, and more generally, in a certain zeal for pushing some of the
principles as far as they can be pushed. I suspect that a large part of the
opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment is based not on the princi-
ple that is stated in the amendment, but on the history of the kind of
zeal that has been seen in other areas when similar words were used
over the past couple of decades. What has been delicately referred to
as the "potty problem" is only the tip of the iceberg of the kind of
mindless application of a principle, which carries it just as far as it can
be carried regardless of the consequences.
Let us look briefly at the picture of women in American society and
some misconceptions, I think, that are fairly widespread. One miscon-
ception is about the history of women in the American society, particu-
larly in the labor market.' Professor Ginsburg's article refers to the
trend toward opening opportunities to women. Like many trends, its
validity depends entirely upon the base year that you choose. In the
image that has been projected, there has been a rise of women occupa-
tionally as a result of rising consciousness and political action in recent
years. In reality, if you look back through history, you will find women
far more represented in high level positions forty or fifty years ago than
today.2 This is not only an interesting isolated fact; it has some impli-
cations for the kinds of explanations that are given for why women are
"underrepresented" in various fields. Forty or fifty years ago, a higher
percentage of all the M.D.'s, Ph.D.'s, professors, and college presidents
in this country were women. As of about 1900, higher percentages of
people in ho'v Who were women than in the 1950's.
1. See T. SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION RECONSIDERED 11 (1975). See also J. BERNARD,
ACADEMIC WOMEN 39 (1964); Parrish, Professional Womanpower as a National Resource, 1961 Q.
REv. oF ECON. & Bus. 58-59.
2. See T. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 11.
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The rise and fall of women occupationally is very heavily correlated
with the age of marriage of college-educated women. When college-
educated women married later in life, they were far more represented
in these high level professions. As the average age of marriage of col-
lege-educated women fell, the proportions of women in these profes-
sions also declined.3 There has indeed been a rise in recent years. That
rise is much more highly correlated with demographic trends than with
any discernible political trends. In many areas it has not yet reached
the level that was reached half a century ago.
One of the things that some of the women's movement arguments
have done is to parallel the arguments in various other kinds of move-
ments; namely, to argue that there has been a past that was highly dis-
honorable not merely on the part of the general society, but on the part
of the group that is in question. There are a number of problems with
that approach. One is that one finds the very same pattern of the de-
cline in women in high level positions in women's colleges adminis-
tered by women-where the presidents are women, the deans are
women, professors are women. That is, one finds in many leading wo-
men's colleges a domination of women at the full-professor level, say,
in the 1930's, and of men by the 1950's.4
When we look at a male-female public opinion poll, one finds negli-
gible differences between the sexes on most issues of "women's libera-
tion" (so-called), and in a number of cases the males responded more
favorably to liberation than the females.
The historical data would suggest that marriage and family responsi-
bilities have had a great effect on the woman's role in the labor force,
and contemporary data seem to reinforce that. For example, single wo-
men in their thirties who have worked continuously since high school
have slightly higher incomes than single men in their thirties who have
worked continuously since high school.5 If you look at single female
Ph.D.'s who received their degrees in the 1930's and 1940's and you ask
what percentage of them were full professors in 1950's, it was a slightly
higher percentage than their male counterparts. In short, much of the
difference between men and women that appears in the gross statistics
3. See J. BERNARD, supra note 1, at 62, 74, 215.
4. See generally The Economic Role of Women, in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
(1973).
5. See T. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 32-33; The Economic Role of Women, supra note 4, at
105.
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is, in fact, a difference between married women and all other persons.
Sometimes this is concealed in the data because they define single wo-
men in such a way as to include women who are widowed, divorced, or
separated; that is, women who have had a part of their work lives inter-
rupted by marriage and childbearing. When we restrict it to women
who were never married, an entirely different picture emerges. That is
why I emphasize the phrase "never married."
If we assume that what is happening in marriage is that women are
in effect contributing towards jointly earned income (even if only the
husband's name appears on the paycheck), then much of the internal
breakdown we see makes much sense. That is, given that a married
man has someone helping him earn his wages, if only by freeing up
great amounts of time to devote to his profession by virtue of his wife's
homemaking and other efforts, then we would expect married men to
be making more than single men, other things equal. We would expect
married women to be making less than single women because they are
contributing towards men's earnings. We would expect to find single
men and single women earning about the same. And that is what we
do find when we break down the statistics.
We need to separate different kinds of decisionmakers-some of
whom operate in a competitive, economic market; some of whom oper-
ate in a highly insulated market such as in the public utilities or the
government itself. Insofar as we deal with people who operate in an
economic market, we deal with people whose errors in judgment on
women's capabilities create costs that they themselves have to bear. It
may well be that there are general illusions among certain classes of
employers about women, but it is very unlikely that millions of human
beings will have the same illusions in exactly the same degree. A deci-
sive competitive advantage would be gained by whatever employer
who-by either intelligence or dumb luck-happened to have picked a
belief that coincided more closely with the facts. There is no such force
at work in government. There is no reason why a government agency
cannot be wrong for fifty consecutive years. One could, in fact, put
together an impressive list of agencies that fit this description.
The kinds of constraints under which different decisionmakers oper-
ate create a need for different kinds of legal approaches; that is, differ-
ent degrees to which the government will prescribe to decisionmakers
what their decisions should be.
There are many behavioral differences between men and women;
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they are not exhausted by purely gross physical differences. For exam-
ple, young male drivers have far higher accident rates than young fe-
male drivers. In some states, as I see from Professor Ginsburg's article,
the legislature has apparently judged that young women have more
maturity for handling drinking than young men. The question is not
whether the legislatures are right; the question is whether that is a rea-
sonable judgment for them to make. There is still, I hope, a difference
between saying that there is some reasonable area in which a person
may exercise judgment and saying that one agrees With the way he ex-
ercised it.
There are also behavioral differences not because women are differ-
ent from men, but because both women and men behave differently in
each other's presence than they do separately. The military would be
one such area. In the military, there is some reluctance, for example, to
assign brothers to the same combat unit because there are very strong
nonmilitary attachments involved that in combat can interfere with the
performance of military tasks. If one brother is wounded and the order
is to pull back, one may not want to leave one's brother out there on the
battlefield to the mercy of the enemy, though in fact that may be what
is dictated by military considerations at the moment. There is even
some concern in the military about promoting officers to be in charge
of larger units that include a unit of which they were previously in
charge; that is, to make a platoon leader head of a battalion that in-
cludes his platoon and other platoons, because of the possibility (or
certainly the suspicion) of favoritism that would arise when he had to
choose different platoons for different hazardous assignments.
I think we could say even in this day and age that there are tenden-
cies for men and women to form strong nonmilitary attachments. This
might also be a reason for having some concern about their interaction,
quite aside from any differences between the two of them. Similar
kinds of considerations obviously would be involved in other kinds of
hazardous areas where group morale is very important.
There are different labor force participation rates between men and
women. More important than the gross difference in rates is the fact
that women's labor force participation rates have been found to be
highly correlated with the number of children they have and with the
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size of their husband's income.6 A special problem is created for those
females whose career patterns are much more similar to the career pat-
terns of males than they are to the patterns of other females. One of the
problems with separating out such women is that there are large sorting
costs. One of the concepts that I find completely missing from so many
discussions of these status-based arguments is the notion of cost.
There is a very easy temptation to speak of treating each individual
as an individual. It has a good ring to it, but in reality we do not do
that in almost any area of our lives, however much we talk about it.
Even those who think we should judge each individual as an individual
have generally presorted the individuals first, and then treated each in-
dividual as an individual. We may treat each individual on campus as
an individual. We do not necessarily treat someone that we run into on
skid row in exactly the same way as someone we run into on campus.
If we see someone lurking in the shadows at night on a side street, we
don't judge him as an individual; we cross the street because the cost of
judging him as an individual may be too high. He may just be the
neighborhood doctor, or the kindly gentleman down the block out
walking his dog, but then again, he may not.
One of the phrases that enters the discussion over and over again is
sexual stereotyping. Undoubtedly, this is something that happens. The
question is do we apply that phrase to any level of sorting and labeling
that goes on, regardless of the empirical basis for it?
Much of the opposition to and questioning of the Equal Rights
Amendment derives from a fear of the runaway interpretations that are
likely to be made of the law. This kind of argument obviously can be
made against any law. The great problem is that the history of the last
ten or twenty years gives all too much evidence of people ready to
make such runaway interpretations. There are already people who are
talking about how the representation of women in this or that occupa-
tion indicates how much discrimination there has been by employers,
for example; that is, people who confuse opportunity on the one hand
and results on the other.
In Professor Ginsburg's article, there was some discussion of how
physical characteristics would still be allowed to be taken into account
in decisionmaking under the Equal Rights Amendment. The question
6. See generallt' W. BOWER & T. FINEGAN, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR FORCE PARTICIPA-
TION (1969).
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is what is peculiar about physical characteristics as distinguished from
other characteristics that may be of equal weight in the decision?
One of the real problems in talking about the Equal Rights Amend-
ment in any rational way is that to many it appears as a sort of referen-
dum on the ultimate worth of women. I think that is unfortunate
because it is hard enough to formulate social decisions with which soci-
ety can live without also treating this decision as some sort of measure
of the ultimate worth of one-half of the human race.
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